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American Legal Restrictions
on the Use of Union Economic
Weapons Against
Multinational Employers
JEFFREY K. ROSS*
In recent years, the explosive growth of multinational corporations'
(MNCs) has challenged a labor movement response2 in the developing
field of international labor relations. This international sector, however,
will create special and somewhat unique problems for the American
labor movement.3 Union efforts will be confounded by unequal bargain-
ing power and by diverse labor relations philosophies4 and structures.'
* Member of the Illinois Bar. Associate, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson;
Chicago, Ill. B.S. 1973, J.D. 1976, Cornell University.
1. Despite the many efforts of academicians and practitioners, there has been no sub-
stantial agreement upon a comprehensive definition of a multinational corporation. For
the purposes of this article, a MNC is any corporation which does business in more than
one country.
2. For a general discussion of the first tentative attempts to establish a transnational
labor relations structure, see Seham, Transnational Labor Relations: The First Steps
Being Taken, 6 LAW AND POL'Y INT'L Bus. 337 (1974).
3. In other business sectors throughout recent history, union strikes, pickets, and boy-
cotts have been used to counterbalance the power of employers and obtain benefits for
the workers involved. Unionization of the craft industries during the late 1800's and early
1900's was followed by the industrial organization of the 1930's and the public sector
organization of the 1960's. Other areas in which organizing and collective bargaining are
currently being contemplated are in prisons, in the military and in various community
dispute settings. One would expect that American unions in dealing with multinational
corporations will use these same tools to improve conditions for their workers.
4. See Fairweather, Trends in International Collective Bargaining, 26 IRRA
PROCEEDINGS 145, 149-51 (1973). Other problems cited as hindering meaningful collective
bargaining between international labor organizations and multinational corporations are
inter-union rivalries, personality clashes, and a lack of resources. Id. at 146. In EEC
countries, one author finds "an unceasing war among Socialist, Christian, and Communist
unions to organize available workers. . . ... Comment, National Labor Unions v. Multina-
tional Corporations: The Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 124, 145 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NLU v. MNC].
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Most importantly, the labor movement will find that the United States
legal framework for labor relations will severely restrict many potential
union actions' necessary to create a balanced labor relations system.
Coordinated union tactics, of even greater importance in use against
multinational corporations in international affairs than in the domestic
arena, will still be restricted by various state and federal laws. The use
of union weapons with secondary effects-strikes, pickets, and boy-
cotts-will continually be prohibited. Moreover, certain union weapons,
traditionally legal in the domestic sphere, will be censured when used
against MNCs because of the conflict of law solutions made necessary
by the foreign effects of the union actions. It is these limitations-the
various and overwhelming American legal restraints on labor activity to
challenge the power of MNCs-that this paper will examine.'
In order to study the limitations, it is first necessary to determine the
status of a multinational employer under the labor laws. This discussion
will be followed by an analysis of the scope of jurisdiction of each of the
relevant statutes over labor activity in the international sector. A series
of probable union tactics will then be discussed to demonstrate the
restrictive legal results. Finally, a number of potential solutions will be
offered to remedy the legal inequities.
In addition, the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FIFTY-FIRST
CONFERENCE, Tokyo 1964, 304-592, contains an extensive discussion of the divergences
between the various antitrust national legal systems.
5. For an analysis of these structural problems facing coordinated international labor
activity in Europe, see NLU v. MNC, supra note 4. The authors of the Wagner Act in
1935 were well aware of the dysfunctional consequences of unequal bargaining power:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organ-
ized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially bur-
dens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners
in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.
National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
6. Discussion in this paper concentrates on the use of specific labor weapons against
multinational corporations. The labor law requirements surrounding collective bargaining
are not included. For a discussion of the MNC's duty to bargain over certain issues related
to foreign affairs, see Kujawa, Foreign Sourcing Decisions and the Duty to Bargain under
the NLRA, in AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION (D. Kujawa ed.
1968).
7. While this paper is limited to actions by labor unions against multinational corpora-
tions, the MNC response to the minimal labor pressure exerted thus far is discussed in
Roberts & May, The Response of Multinational Enterprises to International Trade Union
Pressures, BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 403 (1974).
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I
MNC: SINGULAR OR PLURAL LEGAL ENTITY
The legitimacy of many labor weapons, especially secondary union
activity under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), will depend
on whether a given MNC is determined to be a single employer entity
or is found to constitute numerous separate companies. Using economic
form alone, a multinational corporation, like any other large corporation
with separate branches, subsidiaries, and divisions, would seem to be
a unitary employer However, by employing a substantive analysis,
the National Labor Relations Board and the courts have sought to ef-
fect the essential Congressional purpose behind the secondary prohi-
bitions which was to insulate the neutral or innocent secondary em-
ployer'1 and prevent the unnecessary spread of the union-management
conflict by narrowing the areas of dispute." Consequently, the Board
has struggled with a continuing series of fact situations in an
attempt to elucidate the controlling factors which determine whether
the separate components of a large company deserve NLRA protection
from secondary union activity. 2 In these analyses, the following factors
have been accorded emphasis-an active or common control, an appre-
ciable integration of operations and management policies, a common
labor policy or, employee exchange, a market price transaction of goods
and services, and a mandatory centralization of programs, services, or
benefits.' 3 Using these criteria, the Board has determined that the incor-
8. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
9. For a recent overview of the unitary-separateness doctrine as it applies to the various
parts of a domestic enterprise, see Siegel, Conglomerates, Subsidiaries, Divisions, and the
Secondary Boycott, 9 GEORGIA L. Rv. 329 (1975). See also note 13 infra.
10. See George Koch Sons, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 59, aff'd 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973),
wherein the Board stated:
The key consideration in any determination in this 8(b)(4)(B) area ... is whether
the pressured employer is truly the primary with whom the union had its dispute
or whether in the particular circumstances of the particular case, the pressured
employer was a neutral to the dispute.
201 N.L.R.B. at 61.
11. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
12. "[T]he common law of labor relations has created no concept more elusive than
that of 'secondary' conduct; it has drawn no lines more arbitrary, tenuous and shifting
than those separating 'primary' from 'secondary' activities." Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386-87 (1969). The first Board case
showing a willingness to take a substantive rather than a form approach was Alexander
Warehouse and Sales Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 916 (1960), although in that case, the Board held
that the various warehouses of an employer legally constituted a single employer.
13. While all of these factors probably need not be present, Hospital & Institutional
Workers Local 250, 187 N.L.R.B. 218 (1971), the Seventh Circuit has upheld the NLRB
1976]
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porated divisions of a parent corporation" as well as the unincorporated
divisions of a parent corporation may be deemed separate employers for
the purpose of obtaining protection from secondary pressure.' There-
fore, it follows that the foreign and United States operations of a multi-
national corporation, depending upon their interrelationship, may be
viewed as separate employers for the purposes of the NLRA prohibitions
upon secondary activity.'"
Limiting this analysis, however, is the ally doctrine,"7 which may serve
as a defense to secondary union actions against the various operations
of multinational corporations which have been found to constitute sepa-
rate employers.' This doctrine holds that where a secondary employer,
by previous agreement, performs work during a strike which ordinarily
would have been done by the striking employee of the primary employer,
that secondary employer is an "ally" of the primary employer and hence
not protected by the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA.11 Cer-
tainly, proving the existence of an ally relationship between branches
of a multinational corporation would not appear to be a difficult task.
Furthermore, evidence of coordinated activity between two parts of an
MNC may preclude a finding of separateness in the first place.
guidelines. NLRB v. General Teamsters Local 126, 435 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1970). The
Second Circuit, however, has cautioned against the mechanical application of the Board's
criteria as the sole determinants of separateness. It has suggested the necessity of a case-
by-case analysis using other judicially determined criteria which seem appropriate, such
as evidence of neutrality. NLRB v. Local 810 Teamsters, 460 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). For a more detailed discussion of the history of the unitary-
separateness problem, see Leonard, Coordinated Bargaining with Multinational Firms by
American Labor Unions, 25 LAB. L.J. 753 (1974).
14. Local 46 Miami Newspaper Pressmen (Knight Newspapers), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346
(1962).
15. Local 69 Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970); Washington-
Baltimore Local, AFTRA, 185 N.L.R.B. 593 (1970).
16. There is no reason to believe that the domestic separateness criteria will not receive
similar application in an international setting. If anything, the foreign aspects of a MNC's
activity will accentuate the divisible nature of the organization.
17. For an analysis of the history and recent construction of the ally doctrine, see Irving,
The Struck Work Ally Doctrine: Some Issues and Answers, 9 GEORGIA L. REv. 303 (1975).
18. The origins of the ally doctrine are found in Douds v. Local 231 Metrop. Fed'n of
Arch'ts (Ebasco), 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) and NLRB v. Local 459 Bus. Mach.
Mechanics (Royal Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962
(1956).
19. The general requirements for invocation of the ally doctrine are that: (1) the work
being done by the secondary employer is ordinarily done by the primary employer; (2) the
work done will benefit the primary employer and thus have a strikebreaking effect; (3)
there was a prior arrangement between the primary and secondary employer for such work
to be done; and (4) the ally knowingly performs the struck work. See Irving, supra note
17, at 305.
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With respect to union activity against multinational corporations, it
is therefore clear that each case will have to be examined on an individ-
ual basis to determine the separateness or unitary nature of the employ-
er(s). The legality or illegality of a given union action may well turn on
just this determination. In all probability, the foreign operations of mul-
tinational corporations will be treated as separate employers, but in
many of these cases, the ally doctrine may protect the legality of the
union weapons being used.
II
INTERNATIONAL SCOPE OF THE RELEVANT STATUTES
A. NAIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
On its face, the NLRA has a rather broad international scope of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction which its sponsors "based squarely upon the
power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states and
with foreign nations." 0 The definitions of terms such as "labor
organization,"2 "employer," 22 and "employee"" contain no require-
ments of American nationality. "Commerce" is expansively defined to
include, in addition to interstate trade, ". . . trade . . . between any
foreign country and any state . . . or between points in the same state
but through. . . any foreign country."2
In fact, however, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the
courts have severely narrowed the international subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the NLRA. The determinative factor in the established series of
cases denying jurisdiction has been the judicial desire to refrain from
interference in the foreign affairs of the United States and the internal
labor affairs of foreign countries. With respect to the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA),2 the Supreme Court has stated
that in the "delicate field of international relations there must be pres-
ent the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed" to sup-
port a finding that the Act confers jurisdiction on the Board.26 This
20. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935). The same comment was repeated
at H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74TH CONG.,
1st Sess. 10 (1935).
21. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
22. NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
23. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
24. NLRA § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1970).
25. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
26. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). See also McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963).
19761
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principle is equally applicable to the NLRA. Because that affirmative
intention is rarely found, the Board has continually refused to accept
jurisdiction 7 over most cases containing foreign elements. 8 Further-
more, the courts have consistently reversed more expansive interpreta-
tions attempted by the Board. 21 Jurisdiction has been declined in organ-
izational campaigns"0 involving foreign employees and a foreign em-
ployer in a foreign jurisdiction,3 foreign employees and a foreign em-
ployer in United States jurisdiction, 32 foreign employees and an Ameri-
can employer in a foreign jurisdiction,3 3 American employees and a for-
27. Even though the Board arguably possesses statutory jurisdiction, it may neverthe-
less decline to exercise such jurisdiction on the basis of administrative discretion.
28. One minor exception to this position is the recent case of Freeport Transport and
Robert I. Carr, 220 N.L.R.B. 125 (1975), which granted Board jurisdiction in a discharge
case where an American resident and citizen was employed in Canada and the United
States, but was working out of the Canadian terminal of his American employer. The case
arose from the employee's participation in an American union organizing campaign which
for a time focused on the organization of Canadians. The Board held that the numerous
American contacts were sufficient to establish that the employer was in commerce within
the meaning of the NLRA and offered no discussion of possible interference with Canadian
law, foreign policy, or foreign wage-cost decision-making.
29. For example, in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10 (1963), the Court reversed a Board ordered representation election involving
foreign crews of foreign flag ships because the Board's order was "in excess of its delegated
powers and contrary to a specific prohibition of the Act." 372 U.S. at 16-17. NLRB
jurisdiction has also been reversed when foreign policy questions are involved. NLRB v.
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964), reversing 146 N.L.R.B. 723 (1964).
30. The NLRB has, of course, taken jursidiction over the domestic operations of Ameri-
can multinational corporations. The more difficult question is whether the activities of
unions and employers, otherwise within the statutory requirements of NLRA jurisdiction,
remain within such jurisdiction when they involve international considerations.
31. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963),
the Supreme Court reversed the NLRB assertion of jurisdiction over an organizing cam-
paign by foreign crew members of a foreign ship in a United States port because of a
judicial desire to prohibit Board intrusion into the internal affairs of the ship. For the
purposes of maritime law, a ship is considered part of the territory of the flag she flies.
See Comment, Foreign Ships in American Ports: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction, 9
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 50, 62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Ships].
32. In accordance with the narrow jurisdictional interpretation of the scope of the
NLRA, the Board has declined jurisdiction in cases where the employer enjoys a close
relationship with a foreign government. For example, the NLRB declined to assert juris-
diction over the operations of the North American ticket agency because of the agency's
close relationship with the British Railway Board, an arm of the British government. The
agency was a wholly-owned subsidiary of BRB which formulated its labor and managerial
policies. Furthermore, a number of the agency's employees were British nationals working
under visas controlled by the BRB. British Rail International, 163 N.L.R.B. 89 (1967).
33. The NLRB has continually relinquished jurisdiction, as a matter of discretion, over
attempts to organize foreign employees working for American employers in the Panama
Canal Zone. For the purposes of commerce, the Canal Zone is considered a foreign coun-
[Vol. 10:59
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eign employer in United States jurisdiction," and American employees
and an American employer in a foreign jurisdiction.3 Under certain
circumstances, the Board has even denied jurisdiction over American
employees working for an American employer in the United States.36
Board jurisdiction over unfair labor practices," such as organizational
and secondary picketing, involving foreign parties has been discussed by
the Supreme Court in a series of cases stemming from maritime affairs.38
try. 19 U.S.C. § 126 (1970). It is feared that if the Board were to maintain jurisdiction, it
might have an adverse influence on United States foreign policy issues, such as the
negotiations between the governments of the United States and Panama relating to the
future Panamanian sovereignty over the zone. United Fruit Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 135 (1966),
direct review denied, National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). Accord, Contract Services, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 156 (1973).
34. In Agip USA, 196 N.L.R.B. 177 (1972), the Board, in exercising its discretionary
judgment on a representation petition, refused jurisdiction over the employees of a pur-
chasing agency for an Italian corporation, the latter being owned by Italy. Virtually all
the employees were United States nationals. While the question of actual statutory juris-
diction was not reached, the case turned on the close involvement of the NLRA-exempt
foreign government. In a situation without such government involvement, the claim that
the employer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation is immaterial to the
assertion of jurisdiction if the employer is within the statutory jurisdiction of the Board.
Delta Match Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1953). See also The Royal Bank of Canada, 67
N.L.R.B. 903 (1946) (Board jurisdiction granted over Puerto Rican branch of a Canadian
bank).
35. See, e.g., RCA, OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 42 (1973), wherein the Board refused to
grant a union's petition to represent American employees of a United States corporation
working at Distant Early Warning (DEW line) radar and communication stations located
in Greenland because Greenland was a Danish possession.
36. International Air Serv. Co. and Pilot Safety Ass'n, 216 N.L.R.B. 152 (1975). A
United States employer was held exempt from Board jurisdiction with relation to certain
employees who were intimately related with the activity of a corporation which was
exempt as an agency of a foreign government and as a foreign flag carrier. See also
Facilities Management Corp., 202 N.L.R.B. 164 (1973) (discretionary declination of juris-
diction over Wake Island).
37. The Board has jurisdiction of unfair labor practices under NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (1970), if they are practices "affecting commerce."
38. These cases have all arisen from longshoremen's dissatisfaction with the conditions
in the shipping industry caused by the flags of convenience fleets. Where jurisdiction has
been declined in these foreign shipping cases, the Court has gone to great lengths to
emphasize the decision-making influence of "the longstanding principles of comity and
accommodation in international maritime trade." Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v.
American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1974). Of equal importance has been the
desire to avoid inquiry into the internal discipline and order of foreign vessels. See note
31 supra. Yet the jurisdictional limitations cannot be dismissed as pertaining only to
maritime problems, for similar comity principles in international trade and similar dis-
tasteful involvement in foreign employment relations can also result from contemplated
union actions against multinational corporations. For example, the petition for certifica-
tion by an American union of the foreign employees of an American MNC subsidiary
19761
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In the first and leading case, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,3" the
Court held that picketing by an American union in support of a strike
by foreign crew members on a foreign ship was outside the jurisdiction
of the Act because the Act was intended as a "bill of rights for American
workingmen and their employers."40 Six years later, in Incres Steamship
Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union,4 the Supreme Court de-
nied NLRB jurisdiction in a situation involving picketing by an Ameri-
can union of a foreign ship in an effort to organize the foreign crew
because the dispute involved was not "in commerce" within the mean-
ing of the NLRA. In 1969, in Ariadne Shipping Co.,4" the Court did grant
Board jurisdiction over picketing of foreign ships to protest substandard
wages paid to non-union American longshoremen because the initial
dispute-payment of wages to American workers-was "in commerce"
within the meaning of the Act. However, in the latest cases in this field,
the Court has denied Board jurisdiction over picketing by American
unions to protest the allegedly substandard wages paid foreign seamen
who were employed by foreign ship owners under contracts made outside
the United States. The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, in Windward
Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO,43 held that
this type of picketing fell within the rule of the Benz case because
"[v]irtually none of the predictable responses of a foreign shipowner to
picketing of this type, therefore, would be limited to the sort of wage-
cost decision benefiting American workingmen which the LMRA was
designed to regulate."44
The full limiting effect of this test was demonstrated soon thereafter
in American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n which arose from
the identical circumstances as Windward Shipping. In order to invoke
NLRB jurisdiction, the unions characterized their picketing activity as
prohibited secondary activity against the local stevedoring companies
would seem to raise similar problems to the certification petition for the foreign ships in
McCulloch. Those ships were also the property of a wholly-owned subsidiary of an Ameri-
can corporation. 372 U.S. at 13.
39. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
40. Id. at 144 (emphasis in original). The Court stated that this history "inescapably
describes the boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our own country
and its possessions." The Court held that the controversy concerned "a foreign employer
operating under an agreement made abroad under the laws of another nation." Id. at 142.
41. 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
42..International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195
(1970).
43. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
44. Id. at 115.
45. 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
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attempting to deal with the foreign ships. The Court acknowledged that
this dispute involved American employees and American employers in
United States territory. Nevertheless, the purpose of this picketing-to
protest wages paid to alien crew members-meant that the activity
itself was not in commerce. The union activity was not "affecting com-
merce" because of its potential foreign effect." The response of the
stevedoring companies was "a crucial part of the mechanism by which
the maritime operations of the foreign ships were to be affected,"4 and
was likewise outside of the NLRB jurisdiction. Hence, the picketing
activity against the stevedoring companies and the response by those
companies were neither prohibited nor protected by the NLRA.
This test promulgated by the Supreme Court, of restricting NLRB
jurisdiction because of the potential foreign effects of the activity in
question, has severely limited the NLRA protection of labor activities
in international affairs." Thus, where the direct effect of the economic
impact of the acitivity is outside of the employment relationship of
American employees, the NLRB is without jurisdiction because the ac-
tivity in question is not in or affecting commerce." The result of this
limitation of NLRA protection for American workers will be demon-
strated in the subsequent discussion of possible cases arising in the
international sector.
B. STATE LAW
Upon a determination that a certain type of labor activity is beyond
the scope of NLRA jurisdiction, the federal preemption is automatically
removed," and state courts become free to apply their own tort law to
46. Id. at 224.
47. Id.
48. It should be noted how unclear this "foreign economic effect" rule really is. In this
age of transnational trade and international economics, there are many domestic labor
activities which have a strong influence on foreign employers, employees, and markets.
While the Court probably does not intend such a broad curtailment of NLRB jurisdiction,
the test could be applied to exclude employees in any and perhaps all industries with a
global market when the union activity has a foreign wage-cost effect.
49. The Court in Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, AFL-
CIO, 415 U.S. 104, 107 (1974), held that the dispute "could not be accommodated by a
wage decision on the part of shipowners which would affect only wages paid within this
country."
50. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
The removal of federal preemption in such cases results from the negative implication
raised by the Garmon rule which states:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State
purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or
19761
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enjoin the labor activity.5' For example, in all the maritime shipping
cases, the picketing activity of the American maritime unions was en-
joined under the applicable state laws.12 While arguably some of the
picketing activity could also have been enjoined under the NLRA, the
net effect of the removal of Board jurisdiction was a prohibition upon
most, if not all, of the traditional legal labor weapons. As will be seen,
it is this combination of American legal rules which directly hinders the
use of these labor weapons in international affairs.
For constitutional purposes, a state need have only the most minimal
of contacts to apply its law and still meet the requirements of due
process. 53 In a choice between foreign and state law, a state court will
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment
requires that state jurisdiction must yield.
359 U.S. at 244. The Garmon court made clear that if the Board either found the conduct
to be protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, or failed to determine the status of such
conduct, the states were prevented from asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 245-46. See also Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
51. Sixteen states have enacted their own versions of the NLRA provisions regulating
the use of the secondary labor weapons. See 1 CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAWS 40,356
(1976). In such "baby NLRA" states, the union activity would be subject to similar
prohibitions and protections as under federal law. However, in Lodge 76, International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976),
the Supreme Court limited the possible scope of such state regulation by expanding the
range of federal preemption. This was accomplished by the recognition that: '
a particular activity might be "protected" by federal law not only where it fell
within § 7, but also when it was an activity that Congress intended to be "unre-
stricted by any governmental power to regulate" because it was among the per-
missible "economic weapons in reserve . . . actual exercise [of which] on occa-
sion by the parties is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts have recognized." "[ihe legislative purpose may. . . dictate that
certain activity 'neither protected nor prohibited' be privileged against state regu-
lation."
427 U.S. at 141. Nevertheless, most states continue in their efforts to regulate union
conduct through the use of traditional tort statutes. See note 54 infra.
52. A list of the pre-1975 shipping cases resulting in state court injunctions may be
found in Foreign Ships, supra note 31, at 60. Upon remand of Woodward from the United
States Supreme Court to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, the union agreed to discon-
tinue picketing. 524 S.W.2d 772 (1975).
53. See R. CRAMroN, D. CuRRiE, & H. KAY, CoNFLiCr OF LAWS, Ch. 3 (2d ed. 1975).
In a recent case, however, the Supreme Court held that Texas could not apply its right-
to-work law to seamen who performed 80 to 90 percent of their work on the high seas. Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976).
The Court held that an employee's predominant job situs, rather than a generalized
weighing of factors or the place of hiring, was the controlling factor in determining the
applicable law. This case may thus serve as a guide to the outer limit of the extra-
territorial application of state labor laws such as those restricting union economic weap-
ons.
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apply its own state law if doing so would be proper under the choice of
law rules followed in that jurisdiction."' Of course, the state's choice of
law rules may dictate that application of the foreign law is appropriate.
From a labor relations perspective, the significance of either result is
that the state court is not preempted from affecting labor activity which
is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.55 It is the absence of
this federal preemption in the international sector which allows dis-
parate state law entanglement in interational affairs and leads to the
strict curtailment of American labor activity against multinational cor-
porations.56
C. THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT AND ITS PROGENY
The Norris-LaGuardia Act 5 creates a restriction on the power of the
federal judiciary to issue injunctions in labor disputes.' Based upon the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate the Judiciary, the Act is in
force whenever the jurisdiction of a federal court is involved.59 Hence
there is no necessary minimum nexus with commerce as is required of
statutes like the NLRA which are based upon the constitutional power
of Congress to regulate commerce."0
54. Since labor activity is often enjoined under tort statutes proscribing unlawful inter-
ference, the tort choice-of-law rules of the particular state forum typically would be ap-
plied. Under the traditional standard, the effect of tortious union activity within the
territorial jurisdiction of the state would be sufficient for the application of the state law.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 145 (1969). Under the more modem
approach, the decision to apply a given state law is made on the basis of an analysis of
the relevant interests of the competing jurisdictions. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRI, & H.
KAY, CONFLICT OF LAws, Ch. 2 (2d ed. 1975).
55. San Diego Building Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). NLRA § 14(c),
29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1970), passed as part of the Landrum-Griffin amendments after the
Garmon decision, provided for state court jurisdiction over areas in which the NLRB
refused jurisdiction.
56. The dissent in American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215
(1974), believed that "the inevitable result [of permitting state court injunctions] would
be . . to upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our
national labor policy." 419 U.S. at 244, quoting Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S.
252, 260 (1964).
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
58. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NLA].
59. "This Congressional purpose. . . was prompted by a desire to protect the rights of
laboring men to organize and bargain collectively and to withdraw federal courts from a
type of controversy for which many believed they were ill-suited. . . ." Marine Cooks &
Stewards, AFL v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369-70, n.7 (1960).
60. "[T]he question whether Congress intended the federal courts to stay out of the
labor injunction business involves significantly different considerations from the question
whether Congress intended the [LMRA] to apply to the type of picketing. . . involved
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To invoke the Norris-LaGuardia Act, only the broad definitional
terms of Section 13 need be met. A non-enjoinable labor dispute is there
defined as ". . . any controversy concerning terms or conditions of em-
ployment . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."6 There is no limitation
in the statute to American employees, employers, or labor disputes. As
a result, the Supreme Court has held that the Act bars injunctions in
controversies between American unions and foreign employers." There
are a number of exceptions to the broad prohibition of the Act, 3 but the
courts have consistently refused to create an exception on the basis of
foreign economic effects and influence, or even on the basis of alleged
treaty violations. 4
Thirty-four states have enacted "baby Norris-LaGuardia Acts" which
similarly bar state court injunctions in labor disputes. 5 In such jurisdic-
tions, a non-NLRA covered union activity against a multinational cor-
poration is not enjoinable under the state tort law. However, an em-
ployer frequently may sue for damages from the "unlawful interference"
caused by the union. 6 While "baby NLRA's" in a few states may pro-
vide further protection to certain union activity, precluding even em-
ployer damage recovery, 7 only twelve states have both a "baby NLA"
here." Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 115 n.14
(1974).
61. NLA § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970).
62. In Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960), the
Supreme Court applied the Norris-LaGuardia Act to picketing of foreign ships by Ameri-
can unions to protest the alleged substandard wages paid to the foreign crewmembers,
without concern for the legality of the activity under the NLRA.
63. Most of the exceptions are listed in NLA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970). Others include
injunctions obtained by the NLRB in response to unfair labor practices, NLA § 10, 29
U.S.C. § 110 (1970), and judicially crafted exemptions. See text, part III(A) infra.
64. In Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texas v. International Organization
of Masters, Mates and Pilots, AFL-CIO, 456 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
894 (1972), the employer had urged the creation of such an exception because the union
activity in question was arguably in violation of a treaty with Libya and because it
constituted an "impermissible interference with foreign commerce between this country
and friendly foreign countries." 456 F.2d at 52. In agreement with Marine Cooks, the court
refused to create a judicial exception to the Norris-LaGuardia ban on federal court injunc-
tions in a labor dispute involving informational picketing.
65. 1 CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAws 40,356 (1976).
66. The situation is similar to a union action in violation of NLRA § 8(b)(4) which
cannot be enjoined by an employer in federal court, but which can be the basis of an
LMRA § 303 suit for damages. Under the NLRA, however, the additional component in
the statutory framework is that the Board could seek to obtain an injunction against the
alleged § 8(b)(4) action. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
67. See text, part 11(B) supra.
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and a "baby NLRA," the statutory combination necessary to ensure the
same protection accorded federally covered labor activity.68
D. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
The Sherman Antitrust Act" has been proclaimed the "Magna Carta
of free enterprise.""0 In passing the Act, Congress intended to exercise
the full extent of its powers under the Commerce Clause to effectuate
the purposes of the enactment.7 ' As a result, but particularly with re-
spect to international trade, the statute itself provides the basis for the
broad interpretation of its jurisdictional scope." Two important statu-
tory sections provide in part:
Section 1. Every contract, combination. . . or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal ....
Section 8. The word "person" or "persons" . . . shall be deemed to
include corporations and assocations existing under [American law] or
the laws of any foreign country.
To come within the purview of the Sherman Act, a restraint must occur
either in the course of interstate or foreign commerce, or it must sub-
stantially affect such commerce. 3 Thus, MNC activity and labor union
responses are subject to the Sherman Act, even if the locus of the re-
straining events occur overseas,'4 as long as the mandatory nexus with
commerce is in evidence. 5
68. 1 CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAws 40,356 (1976).
69. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
70. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
71. REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL CoMrME TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
77-80 (1955).
72. There is, however, no general agreement among nations as to the permissible extra-
territorial scope of domestic antitrust laws. J. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN
ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT 67 (1970).
73. Although the Sherman Act has the same constitutional basis as the NLRA, the
Congressional intent behind the passage of the statute has been interpreted to reach
international trade restraints affecting domestic trade. United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). For a discussion of the somewhat conflicting
analyses of the scope of the Sherman Act for various types of international restraints, see
Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot, 8 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 16 (1974); Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations, What is Covered?, 8
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974). Under either evaluation, American union restraints would
clearly be within the jurisdiction of the Act.
74. Although free trade has not in fact been the accepted policy in civil law countries,
the EEC, from the outset, has emphasized the need for this approach. See TREATY OF
ROME, Arts. 85-94, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
75. An example of the extremely broad scope of the Sherman Act was demonstrated in
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Labor unions, of course, have had a long history of dealings with the
antitrust laws.7 While the application of the Sherman Act to union
activities is now greatly restricted," the Court has applied the Sherman
Act to labor practices in a number of situations where the union has
combined with a non-labor group to severely restrain trade. 8 The inter-
national setting under discussion would, in all probability, not alter the
application of the broad scope of the Sherman Act to this type of non-
protected activity. Yet the most potent union weapons for use against
multinational corporations may well fall within these Sherman Act pro-
hibitions of labor activity. As such, the labor movement response to the
multinational corporations will provide a fertile environment for breed-
ing this type of illegal agreement.7"
Pacific Seafarer's, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969), where the Act was held applicable to restraints in shipping
between foreign ports involving United States government financed shipments trans-
ported on American ships.
76. The Sherman Act, originally passed in 1890 to break up the large business cartels,
was used extensively against worker organizations. Although Congress had intended to
exempt labor unions from the antitrust laws by enacting § 6 and § 20 of the Clayton Act
(ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)), the Supreme Court held otherwise in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The Court reasoned that the secondary boycott
involved in that case was not a "lawful" activity protected by § 6, nor was it a dispute
with an immediate employer and thereby protected by § 20. See also Bedford Cut Stone
v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
77. The so-called labor exemption was only finally established in 1941. In United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act,
Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act "as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor
conduct." 312 U.S. at 231. As Justice Frankfurter stated in his now famous passage:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit under [the antitrust laws] are not to be distin-
guished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular
union activities are the means."
312 U.S. at 232. The general purpose of the labor exemption was to prevent the socially
unacceptable depression of wages which inevitably resulted from severe competition in the
sale of individual services. Instead, the collective bargaining system was supported and
reinforced by the national labor legislation as the means for controlling labor relations.
78. In the years since Hutcheson, the Supreme Court has attempted to balance the
conflicting governmental policies of free trade and a stabilized industrial relations system
through the use of the exception to the labor exemption, the "combination with non-labor
groups." Ironically, one of the original purposes behind the passage of the NLRA was to
prevent labor strife which would quickly burden the free flow of commerce. See NLRA §
1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
79. See text, parts III(H) and III(I) infra.
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POTENTIAL UNION TACTICS AGAINST MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS: HYPOTHETICAL AND REAL
The American legal framework facing unions in the international sec-
tor, as outlined above, will severely restrict the use of economic weapons
against multinational corporations. The following cases describe a num-
ber of the possible fact situations that may arise in future international
labor settings and demonstrate the effect of the present American legal
arrangement. For the purposes of the case discussions, a generally rea-
sonable assumption will be made that a foreign subsidiary of a given
MNC will be treated as a separate employer." In addition, it is also
assumed that state law will prohibit, in one form or another, union
weapons subject to state jurisdiction. Although not all states would
reach such a restrictive result, most, in fact, will."
A. CASE 1: SYMPATHY STRIKE
A multinational corporation has two unionized plants, one in the
United States and one in a foreign country. As with many collective
bargaining agreements in the United States, the contract with the
American union contains a broad, binding arbitration clause. When the
foreign union goes on strike, the American union, as a sympathy action,
joins the strike to further pressure the MNC with respect to its foreign
subsidiary. The MNC moves to enjoin the American strike in federal
court.
Analysis: The recent Supreme Court decision in Buffalo Forge Com-
pany v. United Steelworkers of America,"2 which held that a federal
court may not enjoin a sympathy strike pending an arbitrator's decision
on the legality of the strike under the no-strike clause in the parties'
bargaining agreement, would seem to preclude injunctive relief. 3 In the
80. See text, part I supra.
81. See text, part II(B) supra.
82. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
83. In Boy's Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the Supreme
Court held that a binding arbitration clause in a contract was the quid pro quo of a no-
strike clause for the duration of the contract and hence an injunction stopping such a
strike was permissible when the strike would so frustrate the arbitral process established
by Congress in the LMRA. However, the Court in Buffalo Forge held that a sympathy
strike does not involve a dispute between management and the union engaging in the
sympathy strike. Since there was no arbitral issue, the enjoining of the sympathy strike
would run counter to the Norris-LaGuardia ban on labor injunctions without serving any
goal of the LMRA.
The enjoinability of sympathy strikes has been a hotly contested issue in recent years.
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international situation proposed, the potent weapon of the sympathy
strike would likewise seem non-enjoinable as the Norris-LaGuardia Act
remains a bar to a federal court injunction against the strike. 4
However, the balance of power in international labor relations will not
be determined so much by an employer's power to provisionally enjoin
a particular labor weapon as it will by the actual legality or illegality of
such a union action. Regardless of the immediate non-enjoinability of
sympathy strikes, Buffalo Forge clearly states that an "employer thus
[is] entitled to invoke the arbitral process to determine the legality of
the sympathy strike and to obtain a court order requiring the Union to
arbitrate .. ."85
Upon an arbitrator's determination that a sympathy strike is in viola-
tion of a no-strike agreement, an employer may apply for, and a federal
court may issue, a court order upholding the arbitrator's decision and
enjoining the sympathy strike. The Court in Buffalo Forge found no
dispute with the assertion that a sympathy strike could indeed be viola-
tive of a broad binding arbitration agreement such as that found in the
Buffalo Forge labor contract as well as in many other American labor
contracts." In addition, the sympathizing union could be liable under
Section 301 of the LMRA for breaching the collective bargaining con-
tract. 7 Given this legal framework, sympathy strikes provide a short-
term usefulness of only dubious significance in international labor rela-
tions."
Furthermore, the importance of this labor weapon is not likely to
increase despite conceivable attempts by unions in future contract nego-
Buffalo Forge reflects the culmination of a split in the Courts of Appeals-the Second,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits deciding in favor of the legality of sympathy strikes, and the
Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits opting for enjoinability.
For an analysis of the recent domestic case law on the power of the federal judiciary to
enjoin sympathy strikes, see Comment, Judicial Sympathy for Sympathy Strikes, 52 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 194 (1975); Comment, Valmac Industries: The Eighth Circuit Adopts Boy's
Markets Injunctions in Sympathy Strikes, 21 S. DAKOTA L. REV. 194 (1976).
84. The definitional requirements of NLA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1970), are met by the
proposed case, and NLA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970), specifically lists a refusal to
work as a non-enjoinable union action.
85. 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976).
86. Id. at 406.
87. Id. at 406-07, quoting the dissent in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195,
228 (1962).
88. Although an improperly issued injunction may often have the effect of destroying
the momentum of a concerted labor action, the refusal to issue an injunction in the face
of conduct that will probably be viewed as violative of a collective bargaining agreement
is not necessarily supportive of concerted activity. In Buffalo Forge, for example, the
union, although opposing any injunctive relief, was willing to submit the issue to arbitra-
tion "on one day's notice." 428 U.S. at 402.
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tiations to limit the scope of binding arbitration and no-strike agree-
ments. Employers, especially multinational corporations cognizant of
the awesome potential of a legitimized sympathy strike weapon in inter-
national labor affairs, will ardently oppose such union proposals.89
B. CASE 2: COORDINATED BARGAINING
An American union and a foreign union agree to bargain for similar
collective bargaining packages to prevent their MNC employer from
shifting production on the basis of labor costs. Besides pushing for simi-
lar wages, hours, and working conditions, the unions plan to insist on a
common expiration date0 so that a unitary and non-enjoinable strike
effort may be used if necessary.
Analysis: Coordinated activity of this type between two American
labor unions is squarely within the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws. The question which immediately arises, however, is whether a
foreign union is a "labor group" or a "non-labor group" within the
meaning of the Hutcheson case.9 A finding of "non-labor group" status
would subject the coordinated international union activity to Sherman
Act scrutiny. In American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll,9 the Su-
preme Court adopted the present test for determining the status of a
particular organization. As the lower court maintained, the focal point
of analysis was:
the presence of a job or wage competition or some other economic interre-
lationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union mem-
bers and the [party in question]. If such a relationship existed the
[party in question was] a "labor group" and party to a labor dispute
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.93
89. Another factor inhibiting the grafting of sympathy strike exceptions onto no-strike
clauses is the reciprocal nature of collective bargaining. An employer cannot offer the
binding arbitration, no-strike compromise on this issue because there is no arbitrable
dispute between the employer and the sympathizing union. The real dispute is in another
collective bargaining framework and is not resolvable by any arbitration with the sympa-
thizing union.
90. Upon expiration of a contract and a subsequent strike in a domestic dispute, a single
picket line at each of the various domestic facilities of an employer will usually shut down
operations as the other unions refuse to cross the picket lines. In an international dispute,
it is difficult or next to impossible to set up picket lines in foreign countries, hence the
importance of the common expiration date in international labor activity. For a more
detailed discussion of common expiration dates as a union tactic for coordinated bargain-
ing against multinational corporations, see Leonard, supra note 13, at 748-50.
91. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). See note 77 supra.
92. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
93. Carroll v. American Federation of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887 (1965).
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Based on the fact that there could be a direct wage competition with
American workers in the American union, foreign unions should proba-
bly be classified as labor groups. 4
Analysis of the NLRA, nevertheless, reveals a less generous treat-
ment. It is true that coordinated bargaining is protected under the Act
and the demand for common contract expiration dates is a mandatory
subject of bargaining over which the American union may strike. 5 Once
an employer accedes to all the demands of the American union, how-
ever, the insistence by the American union on conditioning agreement
upon the successful negotiation of the foreign contract or the common
expiration date will be treated as an unlawful attempt to expand the
bargaining unit. 6 Thus, the attempt of the American union to exert
economic pressure in support of the identical labor demands of a foreign
union will be prohibited.
C. CASE 3: COMMON SITUS PICKETING
As soon as a major new oil deposit is discovered in international water,
an American multinational oil company hires, through its foreign sub-
sidiary, large numbers of low-paid foreign workers to do the necessary
94. Although there have been no cases in point, from a policy perspective, the extension
of the labor exemption to coordinated international union activity would be appropriate
since the purpose of the labor exemption is to prevent competition between employers on
the basis of labor costs. Coordinated union activity would prevent American and foreign
employers from driving down the cost of labor by placing the two groups of employees in
competition for available work. It might be argued that coordinated labor activity will
raise wage costs for employers in many foreign countries and that this would injure the
ability of foreign business to compete in American markets. Yet the purpose of the labor
exemption was to prevent exactly this type of unwanted competitive advantage-an ad-
vantage based on the price of labor.
95. United States Pipe and Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962). A union may bargain to impasse on a mandatory subject of
bargaining. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
96. A union local which refuses to execute an agreement until the conclusion of negotia.
tions involving another local and another employer is in violation of the Act. NLRB v.
Longshoremen Ass'n, 443 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1971). Accord, Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB,
322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963). Likewise, a union which attempts to include employees in the
bargaining unit who are exempt from NLRA coverage is guilty of a refusal to bargain. One
party to collective bargaining negotiations may not deny the Board's authority to deter-
mine the appropriate unit and unilaterally demand a change in that unit. District 50,
UMW, 142 N.L.R.B. 930 (1963).
97. Unions cannot lawfully insist on companywide bargaining as a condition of settle-
ment since it is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating
Comm. for Phelps Dodge, 184 N.L.R.B. 976 (1970). But see Joint Negotiating Comm. v.
NLRB, 459 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972) (parallel negotiation
demands without cross discussions are not violative of the Act).
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construction, drilling and support work for production. The new fuel is
refined and pumped onto the company's supertankers, which also em-
ploy foreign laborers, and is brought to the United States. The Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union (OCAW), protesting
that these jobs were given to low-paid foreign employees rather than
American workers, establishes a picket line at the entrances to the
American-based docking facilities of the foreign subsidiary. The OCAW
picketing is carefully confined within the guidelines promulgated in
Moore Dry Dock98 for permissive picketing on the premises of a second-
ary employer. A representative of the foreign subsidiary seeks to enjoin
the picketing.
Analysis: If the multinational oil company is found to be a unitary
employer, the picketing could be enjoined in federal court under the
Boy's Market exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.9 In all probabil-
ity, however, the foreign subsidiary would be deemed a separate em-
ployer and, consequently, a finding of NLRB jurisdiction would insure
federal protection of the picketing activity. Note, however, that this
case is simply a transformation of the fact situation of Windward
Shipping into the context of a multinational labor problem for we find
an American union picketing at the American site of a foreign employer
to protest substandard wages paid to foreign employees. Presumably,
therefore, the courts will decide that the foreign subsidiary response to
the picketing goes beyond "the sort of wage-cost decisions benefitting
American workingmen which the LMRA was designed to regulate."'' 0
With the NLRB jurisdiction so limited, the foreign subsidiary employer
will be free to pursue appropriate state court action to obtain an injunc-
tion to the picketing.'"' Thus, an otherwise legitimate weapon will be
removed from the union arsenal because of the international repercus-
sions of the labor activity in question. 02
D. CASE 4: CONSUMER PRODUCT PICKETING
The American union of a multinational corporation, fearful of job
losses to the foreign subsidiary of its employer, engages in a "Buy Ameri-
can" campaign. The union establishes product picketing at major con-
sumer retailers and urges the public not to purchase certain products
98. Sailor's Union of the Pacific, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). The rules were adopted in
Local 761, UEW v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
99. See note 83 supra.
100. Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 415 U.S.
104, 115 (1974).
101. But see the discussion of "baby NLA's" in the text, part II(C) supra.
102. The Supreme Court has held that there are no constitutional infirmities under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments created by enjoining such picketing. American Radio
Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 228-30 (1974).
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manufactured abroad by the MNC. A picketed retailer attempts to
enjoin the picketing in state court.
Analysis: This case demonstrates the dangerous extremes to which the
holding in Mobile Steamship'3 can logically be carried. In Mobile
Steamship, the "illegal" secondary picketing in United States territory
by the American maritime workers against the American stevedore com-
panies was held to be outside NLRB jurisdiction. In the hypothetical,
we also have picketing in United States territory by an American union
against a secondary United States employer. However, this time, the
secondary picketing is legal under the Tree Fruits doctrine,," which
holds that peaceful consumer picketing at the premises of a secondary
employer is not prohibited by the Act's secondary boycott provisions.
The legality of the picketing, of course, will be of no assistance in the
union attempt to extend NLRB jurisdiction. As in Mobile Steamship,
the secondary employer retailer will be free to enter state court to enjoin
this "unlawful interference" under state law.' 5 As a result, another
legitimate and otherwise powerful union weapon has lost its potency in
the domain of international labor affairs.
E. CASE 5: INDUCING SYMPATHY ACTIONS FROM FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY
UNIONS
In 1979, the United Rubber Workers (URW) contract with Firestone
Rubber Company again expires without a settlement. As in 1976, Union
President Peter Bommarito flies to Geneva to meet with union officials
representing workers employed by the major United States tire manu-
facturers in nine foreign countries. Bommarito induces them to join in
solidarity with the striking American rubber workers and to refuse to
perform any overtime work so as to prevent an increase in output to
offset the loss caused by the American strike. Workers in foreign plants
are also asked to monitor shipments to see that none are diverted to
markets normally supplied from the United States. A foreign subsidiary
of Firestone attempts to enjoin the URW activity. 8
Analysis: The question of NLRB jurisdiction in this context is a diffi-
103. See text, part II(A) supra.
104. NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
105. It is ironic to note that under the Tree Fruits holding, the peaceful consumer
picketing at the premises of the secondary employer is not prohibited in spite of the fact
that this "interference" will have a detrimental economic effect upon the secondary em-
ployer.
106. The outlined facts are virtually identical to the preliminary tactics of the United
Rubber Workers at the beginning of the 1976 strike. See Unions in Foreign Subsidiaries
to Help Rubber Strikes in U.S., N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1976, at 17, cols. 1, 2.
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cult one. The Board will have to balance its aversion to intruding into
foreign affairs with the fact that the primary dispute-between an
American employer and American employees-is clearly governed by
the NLRA. Whether the alleged unfair labor practice against the foreign
employer will be held to affect commerce within the meaning of the Act
will be the determinative issue. In the Ariadne case,' the Court held
that the picketing of foreign ships by an American union in a dispute
over wages paid to American employees was "in commerce" within the
meaning of the Act. That the "dispute centered on the wages to be paid
American residents"'08 was deemed the crucial variable in the decision
indicates that the Court gave weight to the fact that the interference in
foreign affairs, which normally would remove NLRB aid, did not inde-
pendently exist. The reasoning of the Ariadne court is sufficient under
the facts of the hypothetical case' to insure NLRA control."0
Upon exercising jurisdiction, the NLRB will find a Section 8(b)(4)
violation whether or not the foreign subsidiary is deemed an employer
under the Act, an issue not determined in Ariadne. This conclusion is
mandated by the 1959 amendments to the NLRA which extended Sec-
tion 8(b)(4) protection from secondary pressure to all "persons," regard-
less of their status as employers."' Thus, the foreign subsidiary would
be immunized from the American labor activity."'
If the NLRB were to decline jurisdiction in this case, the potential for
107. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 347 U.S. 195 (1970).
108. Id. at 199.
109. Although the dispute in Ariadne involved primary rather than the secondary pick-
eting posited in this case, the type of picketing would seem irrelevant to the scope of the
NLRA jurisdiction.
110. The Court in Ariadne never determined whether the foreign shipper was in fact
an "employer" under the Act. However, even if the foreign subsidiary is not deemed an
"employer" within the statutory provisions, NLRA coverage still exists. On two occasions,
the Supreme Court has held that even though the Board does not have jurisdiction over
the primary labor relations of a party, it is nonetheless competent to consider secondary
disputes involving such party. Thus in Local 25, Teamsters v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 350
U.S. 155 (1956), and Plumbers Local 298 v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959), a railroad
and a county, both of which were the secondary-employer objects of a primary strike
between parties subject to the NLRA, were barred from seeking relief in state courts from
the secondary boycotts. These two non-employer parties were directed to the NLRB since
NLRA coverage activated the federal preemption doctrine.
111. In addition to the modification noted in the text, the 1959 amendments expanded
the phrase restricting union secondary pressure from "the enployees of any employer" to
"any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce ... ." NLRA § 8(b)(4)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(1970).
112. To minimize foreign interference, the NLRB order might simply forbid union
members to travel out of the United States with the intent to engage in foreign picketing
activity.
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state court injunctive relief would again arise. This time, however, there
would be a serious question concerning the jurisdictional authority of a
state to regulate American union activity centered in a foreign country.
Under most of the generally accepted conflict of laws theories, a state
would not apply its own law to any labor activity occurring abroad.1 '3 A
state could, however, enjoin any labor activity relating to such second-
ary activity that occurs in the United States and thereby substantially
nullify the effect of the picketing.' 4
F. CASE 6: SECONDARY PRODUCT BOYCOTT
A large electric equipment multinational corporation imports elec-
tronic components from its foreign subsidiary which are then assembled
into finished products in the United States. When the foreign union goes
on strike, the leaders of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW) at the American assembly plant convince the Ameri-
can employees to support the foreign union and to refuse to work on any
products containing the imported electronic parts. The multinational
corporation files with the NLRB for an injunction against this alleged
secondary boycott.
Analysis: Initially, NLRB jurisdiction of this case would appear to
involve the same unwarranted intervention into the foreign labor affairs
that removed NLRB jurisdiction in Mobile Steamship. However, that
case cited with approval the two Court of Appeals cases which held the
Board has jurisdiction over secondary activity by an American union
against its American employer where the primary dispute was between
a foreign union and a foreign employer.' The Supreme Court differen-
tiated the Mobile Steamship situation by stating that in the previous
two cases, the fact situations revealed that the union actions were "in
commerce," while in the case under review, the union actions were
not."' The basis of this differentiation of identical fact patterns escapes
reasoned inquiry."' Yet the boycott by the American union in the hypo-
113. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
114. One might presume, for example, that a state could enjoin individual union mem-
bers from traveling abroad to violate the prohibitions contained in the labor injunction.
115. In the Court of Appeals cases, the NLRB successfully enjoined American union
leaders from persuading Continental Grain Co. workers in the United States not to unload
the ships of a Canadian employer being struck by a Canadian union. Madden v. Grain
Elevator Workers, Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967
(1965); Grain Elevator Workers, Local 418 v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 932 (1967).
116. See note 38 supra.
117. Justice Stewart, who joined the majority opinion in Windward Shipping, authored
the dissenting opinion in Mobile Steamship. He believed that the latter fact pattern was
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thetical case could be prohibited by the NLRB,"5 regardless of the for-
eign contacts, if the NLRB finds the boycott to be "in commerce" as it
has done, with court approval, in similar cases.
G. CASE 7: STRUCK WORK AGREEMENTS
An American union signs a collective bargaining agreement with an
American multinational corporation that forbids American employees
from doing any overtime work attributable to production shifts by the
MNC to avoid the effect of the economic pressure resulting from a
foreign strike against the foreign subsidiary of the multinational corpo-
ration. Upon commencement of a foreign strike, the MNC attempts to
enjoin the American union's refusal to perform the struck work.
Analysis: The question of NLRB jurisdiction again hinges on whether
the unfair labor practice affects "commerce" or merely impinges on
foreign wage-cost decisions. Since the clear purpose of the agreement is
to put economic pressure on the foreign subsidiary employer in the
primary dispute with the foreign union, the resulting economic effect on
foreign labor markets removes the agreement from the jurisdiction of the
NLRB despite the fact that the two parties in privity were American." 9
Furthermore, the existence of the "voluntary" agreement would seem to
preclude any state court injunction predicated on tortious interference.
There also are no apparent Sherman Act problems, for the clause is part
of a collective bargaining agreement which seems to be sufficiently re-
lated to wages, hours and conditions of work of the American employ-
ees.20
The viability of struck work agreements in American contracts as a
potent international labor weapon against multinational corporations,
however, may well prove to be illusory. A multinational corporation is
unlikely to agree to such a clause voluntarily. In addition, any economic
pressure to obtain such an agreement could be enjoined in state court 2'
clearly in commerce and used the two fact patterns of the Court of Appeals cases to
support this position. 419 U.S. 215, 241 n.3 (1974)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
118. Note that a valid ally doctrine defense would be of no avail to the union. Even if
the absence of a secondary employer would negate any § 8(b)(4) violations by the IBEW
leadership, the union boycott itself could still be enjoined under Boy's Markets. See note
83 supra.
119. The conclusion that the alleged § 8(e) agreement would be outside NLRB jurisdic-
tion is founded upon the parallel fact situation in Mobile Steamship, where the alleged §
8(b)(4) violation by an American union against an American employer was outside NLRB
jurisdiction.
120. But see text, part III(I) infra.
121. Note that the ally doctrine defense would probably not be available in state court.
On the other hand, if such a labor weapon arose under NLRA coverage, the ally doctrine
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in the same manner as other such labor activity not within the jurisdic-
tion of the NLRA.
H. CASE 8: RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS
The United Steelworkers of America forces a leading steelmaker to
sign a collective bargaining contract containing a clause that forbids the
importation into the United States of steel made abroad by the MNC's
foreign subsidiary.12 The Steelworkers freely admit that this boycott is
a job protection effort that will prohibit the foreign metal from compet-
ing on the United States market. Despite the contract, the multina-
tional corporation sues the American union alleging an unlawful boycott
in violation of the Sherman Act.
Analysis: As domestic industries become international in scope, un-
ions will increase the use of protective measures to preserve their em-
ployees' present jobs and income. When forced upon an employer in a
collective bargaining agreement, such a strategy runs the risk of falling
outside the labor exemption to the Sherman Act if it severely restrains
trade and is not closely related to the traditional sphere of wages, hours,
and working conditions.'2 The agreement in this case may well be sub-
ject to the Sherman Act. It is not in any direct fashion related to the
wages, hours, and conditions of work of the American employees-the
traditional and protected subjects of bargaining. Rather, it is a direct
restraint on competition, a coerced boycott of a foreign product. In the
very first labor antitrust case to reach the Supreme Court after
would preserve its legality.
122. The ability of the American MNC to prevent importation from the foreign subsidi-
ary would preclude a finding that, for the purposes of the Sherman Act, the MNC and
the foreign subsidiary were separate business entities. See generally United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See REPORT OF THE ArORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, 30-36, 88-90 (1955). Care should be
taken to prevent confusing this separateness test with the labor law separateness test for
the purpose of secondary pressure. See text, part I supra. If the MNC were to be treated
as two separate competitors for Sherman Act purposes, the case being discussed would
approximate Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), where a union
which conspired with certain electrical contractors to exclude outside competitors from
the New York City market was held in violation of the Sherman Act.
123. By its very nature, a collective bargaining agreement is a union combination with
a non-labor group which falls within the specific exception to the labor exemption. See
note 77 supra. In Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965), the Court recognized a non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws for agree-
ments that were sufficiently related to traditional union objectives and did not greatly
affect the character of the competition in the industry. A balance was made between the
labor interests sought to be protected and the concomitant restraint on trade produced
by such an agreement.
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Hutcheson, such a boycott was held violative of the Sherman Act.'
While the result of such a boycott would clearly benefit the Steelworkers
and even other American steel producers, the decrease in competition
on the United States steel market would be adequate reason to prohibit
such a union tactic.
I. CASE 9: COERCED STRANGER AGREEMENTS
The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), in an
ambitious job protection effort, pickets and eventually coerces a leading
American textile company into signing an agreement which prohibits
the sale of textile materials to foreign clothing manufacturers who then
export the finished articles to the United States. The ILGWU represents
employees of American clothing manufacturers, but does not represent
any employees of the textile firm. The textile company attempts to
enjoin the picketing and then sues the ILGWU for violation of the Sher-
man Act.
Analysis: Under the NLRA, the garment industry proviso to Section
8(e) fully sanctions this type of refusal-to-deal agreement.'2 Likewise,
picketing to obtain an agreement excepted from the restrictive terms of
Section 8(e) does not violate the Section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibition on pick-
eting to force an employer to sign a Section (8)(e) agreement. 2 The
effect of such a refusal-to-deal agreement upon foreign labor cost deci-
sions of foreign employers, however, might be sufficient to remove
NLRB jurisdiction. If it does, state courts again would be free to enjoin
the otherwise legal labor picketing.
Another problem arises with respect to the Sherman Act. The scope
of the garment industry proviso might not cover textile companies. If it
does not, the hypothetical case resembles the recent fact situation of
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,127 wherein the Su-
preme Court held that a union loses antitrust immunity by coercing an
employer to sign a "hot cargo" agreement not sanctioned by NLRA
124. Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
125. The garment industry proviso essentially exempts the following parties from the §
8(e) restrictions: "persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcon-
tractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts
of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry ... " See 29
U.S.C. § 158(e)(1970).
126. District Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964); Los Angeles
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 214 N.L.R.B. 86 (1974). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A),
(e)(1970).
127. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). For an analysis of the additional confusion Connell contrib-
uted to the continuing uncertainty of the scope of the labor exemption to the Sherman
Act, see 61 CORNELL L. REv. 436 (1976).
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Section 8(e). Thus, regardless of the concomitant Section 8(e) viola-
tion' 2 -or the lack thereof because of the limited NLRA jurisdic-
tion-the ILGWU would face severe antitrust problems.
CONCLUSION
The new and oftentimes unwarranted restraints on labor union activ-
ity that exist in certain international settings may generate support for
domestic law reform such as the trade restrictions embodied in the
recent Burke-Hartke proposal. 2 1 While other federal controls on multi-
national corporations might be created,'30 pressures may soon develop
for the formulation of an international labor code 3' to deal with the
labor problems in international trade.
Alternatively, consideration may be given to the legitimization of
certain otherwise unlawful labor weapons that are especially effective
against multinational corporations-such as secondary pressures'312
even if such weapons remain illegal for domestic purposes.' Favoring
128. The Court in Connell stated:
There is no legislative history in the 1959 Congress suggesting that labor-law
remedies for § 8(e) violations were intended to be exclusive, or that Congress
thought allowing antitrust remedies in cases like the present one would be incon-
sistent with the remedial scheme of the NLRA.
421 U.S. at 634.
129. Strongly supported by unions, this bill, which was ultimately rejected by Congress,
would have placed limitations on foreign investment which had an adverse effect on the
United States job market.
130. One rather simple, yet far reaching, Congressional action would be to amend the
NLRA so that NLRB jurisdiction, like Sherman Act jurisdiction, is extended to its Consti-
tutional limit under the Commerce Clause. Then, NLRA protections would be offered
even if the labor actions had a foreign effect. As it now stands, it is precisely those labor
weapons which have a foreign effect that are most in need of NLRA protection.
It has been argued that a more diligent application of existing legal controls, rather than
the creation of new federal law to curb multinational corporations, is all that is necessary
to protect the interests of labor. For example, the ICFTU has passed a resolution urging
member unions to press for strict enforcement of all national antitrust laws to curb any
abuses of power by an MNC. See W. FELD, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS COLLABORATION
AMONG COMMON MARKET COUNrRIES 93 (1970).
131. "In Europe, legislative enactment is a substitute source of many social benefits
provided in collective bargaining agreements in the United States. ... R. FLANAGAN &
A. Weber, Bargaining Without Boundaries xiv (1974).
132. One rather simple method of legalizing secondary pressures against multinational
corporations would be to make it more difficult for an MNC to obtain a non-unitary
status. If only a unitary status could be achieved by a given MNC, secondary pressure
against a subsidiary would thereby become primary pressure against the MNC.
133. The legitimization in the international arena of otherwise prohibited labor weap-
ons will surely lead to problems in determining which employers qualify as multinational
corporations and are therefore subject to the new pressures.
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this proposal is the lack of protective labor legislation in many foreign
countries which jeopardizes the protections available to American
workers and grants multinational corporations the power to take labor
related actions that would otherwise be prohibited in a domestic
sphere. Since the United States would have great difficulty regulating
MNC labor activity abroad, it seems equitable to remove most restric-
tions on American labor activity in relation to foreign labor affairs so as
to equalize the freedom of action.
This technique could be coupled with a choice-of-law interest analysis
approach which examines the policies underlying the enactment of the
American and foreign laws. Different situations, such as those just dis-
cussed, could be analyzed then on a case-by-case basis by examining
and balancing the relevant national interests before deciding whether to
apply American labor law. While this approach would undoubtedly lead
to a more expansive interpretation of federal labor law jurisdiction, the
NLRB might still decline jurisdiction if the foreign elements involved
outweighed the American legal interests.'34 In either case, the national
labor policies of the affected countries would decide the issue, and need-
less refusals of jurisdiction as well as unwarranted interference in foreign
affairs would be avoided. In addition, meddlesome state law involve-
ment would be removed.
This more rational use of domestic tools combined with a more per-
missive use of traditional labor weapons may well balance the unequal
power relationships in international labor relations.'35 As Judge, later
Justice, Holmes observed in a dissent in a domestic labor relations case,
it is only fair that the inequitable balance of power be redressed.
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between
the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that
134. For an excellent discussion of the relevant factors to be considered in an interest
analysis approach for NLRB jurisdiction in maritime affairs, see Foreign Ships, supra note
31, at 69-81. In a general framework, the relevant variables would include issues of interna-
tional comity, the involvement in foreign relations, the uniformity of labor law treatment,
the relative economic power of the parties involved, the protection of national citizens,
and the avoidance of the infringement of both the rights of foreign citizens and the laws
of foreign states. The final test in whether to grant NLRB jurisdiction arguably should be
based upon the nature of the parties involved, the interests of these parties, and the
potential conflicts with foreign or international law.
135. One might argue that the decisions by the Supreme Court permitting state court
injunctions against maritime union activity were attempts to judicially redress the in-
equitable balance of power in favor of the unions in that industry. Whether the Burger
Court will expand NLRA jurisdiction in the international sector to protect labor union
activity against multinational corporations to redress the balance of power in that field is
a different question.
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of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the
least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and power-
ful. Combination on the other side is the necessary and desirable coun-
terpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way. 3
Legal support for this "desirable counterpart," rather than the legal
restriction that presently exists, will insure a healthier system of inter-
national trade' 31 and promote an improved standard of living for the
workers of the world.
136. Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
137. Indeed, the authors of the Wagner Act in 1935 recognized these beneficial aspects
of a comprehensive industrial relations system:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamen-
tal to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as
to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargain-
ing power between employers and employees.
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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